Policing Political Protest: Paradoxes of the Age of Austerity by Schrader, Stuart
“We received notice from the owners of Zuccotti Park,” went the incantatory call on the People’s Mic in the predawn
darkness of October 14, 2011. We—we thousands—repeated the phrase in unison, without hesitation. “That they are
postponing their cleaning.”  Few repeated that phrase. Instead, we shouted and screamed, whooped and whistled, clapp
and hugged. It remains unclear why the initial threat to evict Occupy Wall Street (OWS), in the name of cleaning the site,
did not occur. Whatever the explanation, as we rallied and learned that no eviction would occur, it felt like anything
—winning, even—was possible. Within a month, however, the outlines of how the movement’s destruction would occur
began to take shape. Internal squabbles and disorganization would play some role. But the chief cause would be brutal
repression by militarized police forces across the United States. 
Anger over police overreaction had mobilized large numbers of protesters in October of 2011, even before the November
15 witching-hour eviction of the New York encampment and the evictions of other encampments across the country.
Flagrant and excessive police action took many forms: Deputy Inspector Anthony Bologna’s use of pepper spray on youn
female protesters, the mass arrest of seven hundred or so protesters on the Brooklyn Bridge, and the critical head injury 
an Oakland protester, the result of getting shot with a still-unidentified “police projectile.” Despite widespread repudiation 
this type of police action among supporters of the movement, police sympathy for OWS rather than police abuse of it wa
major topic of conversation among those trying to predict next steps for the movement after its initial emergence. It was
not until after the eviction, and particularly after the revelation that a private professional organization, the Police Executi
Research Forum (PERF), had helped to coordinate the eviction of occupations in multiple cities, that policing as such
became a focus of commentary. Indeed, Chuck Wexler, executive director of PERF, who had first admitted to the
coordination of evictions on Democracy Now!, later told the Washington Post, “What keeps police chiefs up at night is th
somehow the purpose of the movement will become about actions that the police have taken.”  In other words, Wexler
feared the vaunted neutrality of the police would be called into question.
In this article, I assess the reactions of various police officials to the Occupy movement and to the underlying conditions 
state fiscal austerity that themselves motivated a large proportion of Occupy protesters. I also analyze the framework
several commentators used to discuss the relationship of the police to the “1%” and thus to the movement; I characterize
this relationship as “instrumentalist” to indicate that the police were seen to be working at the behest of the ultra-rich. Mo
explicitly, the framework assumes that the capitalist class, perceiving the first large-scale radical and anticapitalist
movement in some time as a threat to their rule, deployed the vehicle of state power to crush the movement. In contrast, 
argue that the period of increasing austerity makes plausible the instrumentalist conception of the relationship of capitalis
class power and police power, particularly in the context of political protest. I suggest that the appearance of
instrumentalism is better understood as an effect of the structure of state power in the present moment of austerity, whic
offers some hope for Occupy’s vision. Yet because it is nonetheless true that the state did crush the movement, I use thi
foundation to pose provocations—these emerge from questions I think are not asked by the movement’s own
understanding of the conjuncture—about what the movement revealed about the emergent political and economic situatio
and the post-Occupy future.
 
Policing Austerely
In the same heady days that saw the first major protest outside NYPD (New York Police Department) headquarters, itself
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donated $4.6 million to the New York City Police Foundation.  Yves Smith of the “Naked Capitalism” blog asked in
response whether the banking giant was getting a good return on its investment.  Smith attempts to contextualize the
donation by referring to the history of fiscal austerity in New York City, whereby private donations are necessary to make
up for shortfalls in tax revenue. Such private donations, he claims, came into prominence after the increase in crime rate
attendant to cutbacks in city services following the mid-1970s fiscal crisis. Smith writes, “So while this effort to suppleme
taxpayer funding has a certain logic, it raises the nasty specter of favoritism, that if private funding were to become a
significant part of the Police Department’s total budget, it would understandably give priority to its patrons.” It is certainly
true that across the United States police forces have been turning to private patrons to meet basic expenses.
In a PERF publication entitled Labor-Management Relations in Policing: Looking to the Future and Finding Common
Ground, released soon after the JPMorgan Chase donation was reported, Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis remark
“We have always looked at our business as a tax-payer-based business. But . . . I’ve recognized that there are other
sources of funding.”  In addition to federal grants and other aid for law enforcement, he notes that he has “had a lot of
good luck in bringing in funding through foundations. We have the Boston Police Foundation, which is flourishing right now
Our Police Athletic League has also done an enormous amount of fundraising. . . These private funds are available if you
access them properly.”
Davis was not alone in recommending that police departments become active in ensuring that their agencies remain well
funded in an age of austerity. A few months after the Occupy movement’s emergence, the first published comment about 
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), a 110-year-old organization, was not about policing tactics,
black blocs, or crime. Instead, it was about cash. Or, more precisely, it concerned budgetary constraints affecting police
work, which had been thrown into relief by the movement. In the January 2012 issue of The Police Chief magazine, the
IACP’s President, Walter A. McNeil, remarked on the wave of government cost-cutting:
These cutbacks come at a time when our departments are facing new and unique challenges. In addition to addressing
traditional issues of crime and violence, police agencies also are being asked to respond to large-scale protests and act
of civil disobedience. These events often inject law enforcement personnel directly into charged, confrontational
environments with the various citizens they are sworn to protect. This causes a strain both on departmental resources an
on the vital police-community relationship.
In response, McNeil suggested that police executives should become “actively involved in speaking out”: “It is imperative
that we address not only our communities but our leaders as well.” McNeil advocated a simple and well-recognized liber
response: get politically engaged.
As if aware of the risks of encouraging political engagement given the tight yoking of “law and order” politics and the
defunding of the public sector since the 1960s, in the PERF Labor-Management Relations in Policing publication, Dave
Mutchler, President of a Fraternal Order of Police Lodge in Kentucky, warns, “Often we make the mistake of supporting
politicians who don’t work for us, because we personally think like they do, even though their political views are bad for
labor.” What he means is that the tough-on-crime, right-leaning candidates who tend to appeal to conservative, small-
government voters, including many cops, cannot be counted on to save police officers, with their large pension obligation
comparatively high salaries, and union-based contracts, from the budgetary axe. What is more, for such voters the marke
is imagined as the best provider of services, and cops are not immune, even though these “market forces” may put them
out of work. On the competition between police and private security firms, Boston’s Commissioner Davis remarked in the
PERF Labor-Management Forum:
There are about 600,000 cops in the United States. In the 1960s, there were few private security people. Now there are
over two million security people in the United States. So there is now business money being dedicated to our field. We’ve
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As small cities across the United States face bankruptcy, private armed guards are replacing police, who respond only to
calls involving violent crime. 
After the evictions, a flurry of argument, conspiracy theory, and confusion resulted from the revelation that more than a
dozen police chiefs were sharing tips and coordinating their responses to occupations around the country, via PERF.
Oakland’s Mayor Jean Quan fueled the fire by noting that she had participated in conference calls for similar purposes.
 Journalist Naomi Wolf argued that Congress and the White House were actively involved in suppressing the movemen
because they had so much to lose if the movement won some of what she interpreted as its “demands,” such as
restoration of the Glass-Steagall Act.  She explained,
for the DHS [Department of Homeland Security] to be on a call with mayors, the logic of its chain of command and
accountability implies that congressional overseers, with the blessing of the White House, told the DHS to authorise
mayors to order their police forces—pumped up with millions of dollars of hardware and training from the DHS—to make
war on peaceful citizens. 
Although the participation of DHS in these calls would likely come as no surprise to many, the idea that the President,
implicitly in collusion with some key members of the 1%, decides how municipal policing tactics should unfold is beneath
even B-movie screenwriters—but not, apparently, some left-liberal journalists.
Beyond isolated whispers of concurrence with aspects of the polyvocal OWS message, however, the only example of
organized protest by the NPYD during the Zuccotti occupation was a nasty, openly racist rally a borough away, in the
Bronx. This NYPD rally tells us more about the relationship of everyday policing and the different scales of government th
does Wolf’s paranoia about the DHS. The protest was aimed at the African American Bronx District Attorney’s indictment
mostly white officers for ticket-fixing; it also included a detour in which cops harassed people visiting a welfare benefits
office by chanting “E. B. T.,” the acronym for “electronic benefit transfer,” New York State’s method of distributing food
stamps. Beyond the bigotry of such a sordid scene—what is shocking here is not that cops would be bigots but that they
would seem to forget it is no longer acceptable, unabashedly reminding readers of that day’s morning news reports of the
bigotry—of note is the target here. Rather than attacking “criminals” or even necessarily the “welfare cheats” of
conservative racial fantasy, the cops here attack those thought to be taking from the state’s limited pot, the size of which
of keen interest to those employed by the state.
Rather than seeing this strange protest as a diversion from cops’ typical activities, instead it is better to see it as
consonant with them. What these protesting cops seem to understand—and what, as legal theorist Markus Dirk Dubber
points out, much scholarship on criminal justice has forgotten—is that the historical essence of what Dubber calls “the
police power” is its limitlessness.  The police power in this sense has historically concerned many aspects of rule, not
just crime, but as the state reduces its capacities to rule without coercion, the older sense of the police power comes
further and further under the purview of the municipal police. This protest was not against job cuts or curtailment of benef
It was against limitations on cops’ discretion. It is true that discretion is the watchword of street policing, as recognized b
critical theorists like Dubber or practical theorists of law and order like James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, authors of t
famous 1982 Atlantic Monthly article “Broken Windows.” McNeil of the IACP notes that policing large-scale “civil
disobedience” can cut into municipal budgets, which suggests how discretion, in addition to bigotry, links the Bronx protes
and its sideshow of the “E. B. T.” chant: just as the District Attorney indicted the cops thought to have expressed their
prerogative in unseemly or beyond-acceptable ways, undeserved cuts in state funding have the same effect of limiting wh
cops can do on the street. When cops are operating on a shoestring budget, as in towns now declaring bankruptcy, they
are in a defensive position, triaging their responses. Loss of funding can mean loss of the autonomy that allows them to
exercise discretion. They become bound by fiscal constraints above all. Checks from Uncle Sam, not furtive calls from
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 Instrumentalist Explanations
Do the comments of police executives McNeil, Mutchler, and Davis on the dangers police officers face due to ideologies 
austerity and budget-slashing elected officials square with Smith’s take—that policing of OWS was harsh because big
banks donated  cash to the NYPD? For Smith, the reliance of police forces on private benefactors means that they might
play favorites, choosing to defend the interests of the donors who allow them to make up their budgetary shortfalls—rathe
than those protesting against those same budgetary cuts in the first place. It is unclear why the police would, given such 
choice, necessarily choose that alignment, particularly given that their ranks are almost entirely populated by people from
the laboring classes. (It needs to be considered that becoming a cop offers to those with little advanced education or oth
job prospects fairly stable employment, good benefits including a pension, and an early retirement age—something absen
from the private security jobs that, according to Commissioner Davis, threaten to displace them.) In my own experience,
during the massive Times Square protest on October 15, 2011, across-a-barricade banter with an exhausted cop who jus
wanted to get home to watch the hockey game included his asking a group of protesters, “Where were you guys a few
years ago when we were protesting outside City Hall for a contract?” Clearly, for this officer, the exhortation to get
politically engaged, as voiced by the IACP’s President, was reasonable enough. Soon thereafter, when OWS protested
outside Sotheby’s in solidarity with locked-out Teamsters, one older officer nodded in resignation in response to shouts th
the ultra-rich art buyers inside the auction house whom the cops were ostensibly protecting and serving would love to tak
away their union contract and their pensions, as he nevertheless continued to shove us backward.
Although the JPMorgan donation is seen to epitomize the measures the 1% would take to ensure the police department’s
fealty, the need for the donation—chronic budgetary shortfalls— equally would have to be attributed to the political wishe
of the 1%. Therefore, I find insufficient Smith’s interpretation, not to mention Wolf’s, and the myriad variations on both I
encountered during the past year of protest. Such arguments frequently slide into the voluntarist world of conspiracy theo
where interests, means, and ends are clearly delineated for a few (far less than the actual numbers comprising the 1%).
This take might also be seen as a variant of an “instrumentalist” theory of the capitalist state, which understands the stat
as a subject that uses its own power on behalf of capital. Here capital is easily able to convince state managers to act in
its interests, with the present-day fillip that the police become the chief enforcers for these so-convinced managers. Ther
are many sound reasons to attribute the decisions of bureaucrats, lawmakers, and elected officials to the will of the 1%. 
is surely important to account for the effects of the “revolving door” between FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate),
petrochemical, military matériel, and other industry boardrooms; lobbying firms; and the government agencies putatively
designed to regulate them, as well as the preponderance of corporate cash in campaign coffers.
Yet I see major problems with these ideas. First, a surfeit of critiques of instrumentalist theories has been mounted. Cruc
to these are the so-called “structuralist” interpretations, in which “relative autonomy” is the keyword to describe the
relationship of the economic and the political, meaning at the very least that no one-to-one correspondence between the
occurs.  Moreover, “intentionalist” interpretations of class actors—wherein class is simply a socioeconomic stratum wi
corresponding intentions—tend to reify those actors as such, rather than understanding class as specific congeries of
social processes and sets of relations. Stepping out of intentionalist interpretations of class enables us to develop ways 
understand intraclass disputes and their resolution, as well as contradictory strains of ideology, at which the instrumental
theory falters. Instrumentalist rule depends on intentionality; with so little empirical evidence of capitalist class
consciousness, this approach must be dismissed.
With these critiques in mind, as I reflect on the experience of OWS and in light of these police executives’ worries about
the politics of austerity, not only is a different sort of theory required, but it is necessary to explain why this theory (or
perhaps it is better called folk wisdom) of instrumentalism became so palatable and widespread when it did. Indeed, the
early iterations of what has come to be understood as instrumentalist state theory emerged on the cusp of the crisis of th
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Fordist-Keynesian so-called “Golden Age” of capitalist profitability at the end of the 1960s. That moment also marked the
cresting of working-class, rank-and-file, feminist, anticolonial, and black freedom struggles, which seems, in retrospect, to
have been one of a decrement in the ability of the purported ruling class to rule in its own favor. Today, in contrast,
excluding OWS and several of its relatively isolated precursors scattered among the activist efforts of unions, immigrants
environmental justice organizations, and incarcerated people, the United States has seen the apparent success of the
1%’s utopia, with the state fashioned in its image. In many ways, this utopia, structured by the deregulation of capital and
unleashed financial speculation, erosion of worker and environmental protections, privatization or marketization of
previously market-insulated aspects of social life, and state fiscal austerity, is a direct response to the state of the late
1960s, when instrumentalist theory was first enunciated.  The state of the late 1960s offered many more supports for
workers and poor people, though they were admittedly modest and unjust in implementation, than does today’s state.
The emergence of instrumentalist theory at that time signaled the faltering of Cold War consensus thinking, which exclude
Marxist, anticolonial, Pan-Africanist, and other strains of thought that pushed racial and class conflict to the center of soc
theory. It gained acolytes precisely because the common understanding of conflict as a result of differing individual value
could not explain the collective irruptions in the streets, on the shop floors, and in the rice paddies at the end of the 1960
 Yet it seems that instrumentalism’s time did not really come until 2008, when the very FIRE elites who destroyed the
global financial system were rescued by Brobdingnagian state action. But their ideological principles disdained state
intervention in markets, which reminds us how uncertain and conflicted this apparent instrumental rule is. We must
therefore construct an understanding that accommodates at the level of theory, on one hand, such contradictions, and on
the other, the possibility of historical transformations in the relationship of the economic and the political, or of capital and
the state, over time as a result of political struggle in the streets, on the shop floor, at home, and in the voting booth. And
we should historicize social theory accordingly, even if embedded within it are attempts at timeless explanations. I am
therefore in agreement with some of the empirical findings of OWS’s instrumental take on the capitalist state, but I disagr
at the level of theory and explanation.
The state is not a thing wielded by capital. Instead, it is shaped and constrained by relations of the power of capital, the
power of workers, and the ever-growing numbers of unemployed as they continuously contest one another for control ove
social life and the reproduction of capitalist social relations. This struggle is waged in and through the medium of the state
with the outcome shaped or deformed by the balance of forces and their internal contradictions at a given moment. The
imprint of past struggles is long-lasting. When conservatives proclaim that they want to return to a time before the
Progressive Era, they know of what they speak. The state’s contours continue to be shaped by long-past struggles again
monopoly and for women’s rights, as well as by contestation of the imperialist turn of the late 1890s and concomitant
recrudescent antiblack racism, the scourge of lynching, and deeply racialized efforts at poor relief. Today, the moment of
OWS is one of a deep imbalance in forces, but it is also one in which the auguries of a shift in that balance are estimable
One of the keys to this historicizing perspective on the state as malleable medium is fiscal austerity itself.
 
Extending Market Rule
Even if it appears in a hyperbolic and paranoid format in Naomi Wolf’s claims, to dismiss the instrumentalist theory of the
state as quackery would be a mistake. Although there is no conspiracy to have us believing in conspiracies, such
understandings of the joining up of state and capital are widespread and similar. Why they are so widespread must be the
object of explanation. To that end, I propose that the instrumentalist theory appears plausible because of shifts in state
power and transformations in state financing attendant to the creative destruction associated with neoliberalization, many
of which came to a head in 2011. A key result perforce is increased direct interaction of police and poor people, whereas
other agents might have been available before to mediate. These transformations are too multifarious to catalog, but in th
present context, speaking in highly general terms, it is important to highlight on the one hand the “roll-back” of state
15
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provisioning for social welfare and related modes of governance not disciplined by the market in the first instance,
particularly related to working and poor people. These are combined with, on the other hand, the tendential “roll-out” of
privatized, competition-oriented opportunities for employment and highly punitive approaches to noncompliance with thes
programs, to informal-sector work and its particular usages of public space, and to all manner of other coping strategies i
an insecure age.  Areas of social life once protected from the market have thus become exposed to it, if not in its thrall
“The habits and assumptions of the private sector became embedded in the state itself,” argues Stuart Hall. 
If this hollowing out of the state’s welfarist aspects was part of a strategy to entice capital investment by presenting a
particular locality—municipality, county, State, or even the United States as a whole—as competitive, lean, and efficient, 
also had the effect of increasing what could in many cases be considered visible disorder, such as homelessness. A furth
justification for hollowing out and enticement to capital was decreased levels of taxation, necessitated by preexisting
unevenness of taxation levels and, in turn, the tendency of fleet-footed capital to take advantage of its mobility in a sort o
place-based arbitrage, by relocating to more hospitable regulatory, tax, and labor climes. Given decreased revenues,
particularly in locales where enticements were unsuccessful in attracting new investment, the ability of many city halls to
pay the bills grew uncertain, while at the same time economic insecurity gripped ever-greater numbers of people. The
creation of capital-intensive policing approaches that emphasized zero tolerance for disorder meant that new hardware a
software were needed. Unable to turn to tax revenue to cover the costs, as Boston’s Police Commissioner noted, many
agencies turned to philanthropy, foundations, and private donations to make ends meet, even (or especially) in large,
relatively fiscally sound cities. The foundation that received JPMorgan’s donation, for example, has paid for expensive
hardware, including body armor and computers.
After the global economic crisis erupted in 2008, and particularly after the debate over increasing the federal debt ceiling 
summer 2011, budgetary shortfalls have come to seem inevitable. It is under these circumstances that municipalities are
forced to seek other sources of revenue. The instrumentalist accusation understands transactions like the JPMorgan
donation as not only symbolizing, but actually constituting, the relationship of capital and the state, and it proclaims that th
police are enrolled in the management of that relationship, both on the streets and at the level of symbolism. It does not,
however, look at the conditions that give rise to such transactions. Although a full explanation is beyond the parameters o
this work, the theory I am using—the state as a social relation, the subject-object of changing relations of forces—sugge
that austerity itself has taken on a modified purpose since 2008. In the utopianism of neoliberal ideology, austerity holds 
three-fold function. It is meant to confer competitive advantage upon a given jurisdiction, as against others, in the market
for mobile capital. (When all territories are austere, however, no such advantage is available.) Austerity removes the sta
from the scene as an employer and provider of services, thus righting what is perceived as an imbalance or unfair
advantage in market competition (in actuality this righting is a masking of the imbalanced power relations of market
transactions ). Austerity further ensures not only that the tax burden on the wealthy and corporations is minimized throu
cuts in the social wage but additionally that any tax benefits accrue upward through subsidy, incentives, and other forms 
preferential treatment for corporate interests. With almost every State in the United States required by law to balance its
annual budget, there is a direct correlation between decreased revenues and decreased expenditures. Shortfalls have
historically been addressed at State and municipal levels with federal aid; for this reason, the fight over austerity tends to
play out on the federal stage. But it has taken a particular form since the 2008 economic crisis, with revenues already
down on the whole for States due to economic contraction.
Enter the debt-ceiling debate of the past couple years. What is typically a technocratic and nonpolitical procedure becam
the site of partisan brinksmanship. Why? One explanation is that controlling the amount of debt issued means controlling
the amount of aid that can trickle down to States, where the austerity rubber hits the road of suffering. And it is
unquestionable that this suffering is justified through racially invidious constructions of the deserving and undeserving. Bu
then the question arises: why now? It is true that alignments in Congress have shifted in favor of austerity ideologues




Policing Political Protest: Paradoxes of the Age of Austerity | Is This Wha... http://what-democracy-looks-like.com/policing-political-protest-paradox...
6 of 11 10/8/2013 5:04 PM
its infinite power over the state, but instead as evidence of its anxieties. Discussions of deficit reduction and the debt
ceiling couched in terms of the future, of our grandchildren, should be read not as simply about the undue burdens future
generations will face. Rather, these pleas should be read as evidence that capital does not trust that the shape of the sta
in 2012 is durable. It is tractable, and capital does not expect that the state will continue to look as it does today; capital
anticipates that popular struggles will likely gather strength as penury and immiseration grow.
The unruliness of future generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. A Greece-style “haircut” for holde
of US debt could occur in time, and investors know it. Insatiable as they are for the relative safety of US debt in an
uncertain world economy—starved as it is for effective demand by state retrenchment, credit tightening, unemployment,
and wage compression—perhaps the only way US debtholders can imagine to protect themselves is to limit the supply
because they admit their voracity knows no limits. Bondholders’ (e.g., pension funds, hedge funds, proprietary trading
desks of investment banks, other countries’ sovereign wealth funds, etc.) fear resides in their cognizance that they do no
exert permanent instrumental rule, even over technocratic fiscal and monetary policy. These two are furrows in the
strategic field of the state plowed by contending forces in struggle. The 1%’s plow blades are dulling, its oxen restive. 
 
Medium-Term Futures
Yet these long-term anxieties and hopes tell us little about what to expect in the coming months and years, as the
anniversaries of OWS will come and go, and on those days forward-looking police action will extend to us its gloved hand
and truncheon on the streets. Critical analysis of neoliberalization focuses on the down-streaming or down-scaling of risk
entailed by the creative-destructive transformations and retrenchment of the admittedly paltry Cold War US welfare state
Risk here comprises relatively predictable susceptibility to harm and danger up to and including premature death.  With
the notion of down-streaming risk, analysts highlight the way municipalities, neighborhoods, communities, households, an
individuals become responsible for the management and absorption of risks that had until the 1980s fallen within the
purview of more well-positioned entities, chiefly the national state. The need of governments, and particularly police force
to manage budgetary risks through philanthropic means—an unsure risk-management strategy, given its dependence on
bullish economic conditions and corporate munificence, which are liable to be directly correlated—therefore shares
affinities with the on-your-own conditions facing many individuals and families who have few places to turn for assistance
and aid, other than charity. This insecurity can be understood as produced in part by techniques of roll-back
neoliberalization, with the self-actualizing entrepreneurial response expected of individuals in labor markets paralleled by
similar expectations for state agencies, exemplified in the Boston’s Commissioner’s advice that funds are available, if on
police agencies do the work of finding and securing them. OWS’s post-austerity plenitude in its provision of social servic
previously eliminated by retrenchment (admittedly without professional training in most cases) as well as others, like
seemingly infinite supplies of dry socks, was intended to prefigure a different model of social organization. Its reliance on
charitable giving and an entrepreneurial, can-do spirit among the already overworked and the underemployed, however,
admits conditions of emergence within the neoliberal frame. Too few commentators have asked whether we really do aim
for a prefiguration that looks back in many ways to a prior period, that of capitalism’s pre-1970s-crisis successes.
Police officers themselves are aware how keenly this down-streaming of risk puts individuals in positions in which they a
likely to interact with police, given that the state now lacks a retinue of social-service providers. Baltimore’s Police
Commissioner Fred Bealefeld intones, “Baltimore is reducing drug addict treatment, reentry programs, jobs programs for
teenagers, funding to reduce teenage pregnancy. . . . We learned hard lessons in the 1990s and built programs to help le
us out of some of these social problems. And now these programs are first on the chopping block. I’m afraid we’ll be seei
the results of all this in the next few years.” At the same time, the police themselves are not immune from the very sam
set of structural circumstances. Therefore, donations and philanthropy seem to tilt the preferences of police departments
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make ends meet, places individuals and families and situations in which they are responsible for managing and absorbing
risk. (See Margaret Thatcher’s great performative utterance: “There is no such thing as society.” ) That more well-off
people frequently can avoid such situations, even if consumer credit is what keeps them relatively more secure, creates
the imbalance of police interacting almost entirely with the poor—and even working against them, particularly in the case 
political protests against poverty.
Many uncertainties and openings are on the table in considering the possibilities for resurgent protest. I raise only a few,
roughly in order of temporal horizon. First is the Presidential election. Its outcome will not, in contrast to the conspiratoria
interpretations, fundamentally affect the policing of political protest. But whether it saps or emboldens what in Europe is
called “extraparliamentary” protest cannot be easily predicted now. Once the front pages were cleared of election talk, a
vacuum to be filled by OWS awaited. After Hurricane Sandy, recovery efforts spearheaded by OWS, which could mobilize
far more quickly than relief agencies, have put the movement back in the spotlight. Second is the near-term economic
situation, three aspects of which ring out: the Eurozone crisis, the student-debt bubble, and the lack of ideas about how to
jumpstart the economy. The Eurozone is not yet out of the woods, and, should it fail, the knock-on effects would be
massive. The student-debt bubble is the result of despicable but largely unknown legislation of 2005 that made it all-but-
impossible to discharge student-debt obligations through bankruptcy. This issue is paramount in the United States; it is a
key focus within some parts of OWS and has increasingly become a unifier of the disparate affinity groups that splintered
off after May 1, 2011. More broadly, there is a paucity of ideas on how to reignite the economy. Some would attribute
current woes to the so-called rising organic composition of capital, for which no reliable end is in sight. The reality of
climate change, seemingly a specter only a few years ago, is not proving a “job creator.” Instead, it is as it was
pessimistically predicted to be: bringer, not simply harbinger, of death and destruction. All of these occur against the
backdrop of grinding fiscal austerity, which continues to present itself as a new idea. What is new is that this tactic has
become the panacea for a set of capitalist class actors bereft of ways to ensure the expanded reproduction of capital
within the inherited, unevenly developed, global matrix of waning US hegemony. Beyond such nominal, self-cannibalizing
innovations as high-frequency trading, all that can be imagined is to keep the revolving door spinning, lobby lavishly, and
hope against hope that nothing upsets the balance.
My prediction, therefore, of the future is that the police will remain within the austerity trap. The only way out is through a
realignment of forces cross-cutting the field of the state. For this realignment to occur, mass protest will have to occur an
sustain itself. Its “mass” character need not be constituted by massive numbers but rather by an appeal to the structural
situation of economic dislocation that is faced by massive numbers of people today, as Occupy has. The Occupy
movement has proven, most surprisingly, that a relatively small number of people in the streets can have a great, ramified
impact on politics. The chief impediment to such protest being sustained is, of course, the police. The result, for the polic
is continued austerity. Yet the fact of this austerity and the consternation that results for police executives suggests that
direct confrontation with the police is not the only route of struggle. Instead, to notice how the police themselves analyze
their contradictory situation is to observe that, like the other apparatuses of the state, they are “traversed by the struggle
of the popular masses.”  In the age of austerity, the state continues to reduce itself to core, elementary
administrative-law functions that ensure the expanded reproduction of capital in multifarious ways—and that effect
repression of the dislocated as a key aspect of this activity. State retrenchment means that its repressive apparatuses
proportionally become most of what remains of the state apparatuses. It is in this situation that the state, as a strategic
field plowed by intersectional struggles, becomes more deserving of the frequently misapplied term “police state,” but also
becomes increasingly vulnerable to and deformed by strong popular struggles, precisely because the apparatuses that
conferred legitimacy upon it during the Golden Age of its Keynesian heyday have been evacuated from it. All that remains
repression. How the explosion of private security forces both reflects and problematizes this contradictory position shoul
become a focus of activism. And if history provides any guidance, repression might beget resistance. If after its one-yea
anniversary Occupy exits from the scene, there is no cause for despair. It has created the conditions for its own
reemergence down the line, though in new forms. The 1% will be expecting us. As will the police and private security. For
23
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the next round, we will know to expect, and thus resist, the stage direction: “Exit, pursued by cops.”
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